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ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS, DE INTELLECTU
110.4: 'I HEARD THIS FROM ARISTOTLE'.
A MODEST PROPOSAL
The treatise De intellectu attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias can be divided into
four sections. The first (A, 106.19-110.3)1 is an interpretation of the Aristotelian
theory of intellect, and especially of the active intellect referred to in Aristotle, De
anima 3.5, which differs from the interpretation in Alexander's own De anima, and
whose relation to Alexander's De anima, attribution to Alexander, and date are all
disputed. The second (B, 110.4-112.5) is an account of the intellect which is broadly
similar to A though differing on certain points. The third (Cl, 112.5-113.12) is an
account of someone's response to the problem of how intellect can enter the human
being 'from outside'2 if it is incorporeal and hence cannot move at all; in the fourth
(C2, 113.12-24) the writer who reported Cl criticizes that solution and gives his own
alternative one.
Whether A, B, and C are parts of a single text or even by a single author is
uncertain. Cl begins with the statement 'wanting to show that the intellect is immortal
and to escape the problems...'. As the text stands, this is naturally taken as referring
to a further argument put forward by the person whose views have already been
reported in B. However, in B (as indeed in A and in Alexander's certainly authentic De
anima) it is our intellect that, by developing from potentiality to actuality, becomes
capable of abstracting intelligible forms from matter, and the role of 'intellect from
outside' is to perfect our intellect by giving it this capability (110.22-4, 111.27-36). In
Cl, on the other hand, 'intellect from outside' extending throughout the universe,
though always active (112.9-11, 27-8), functions in a particular way where there is a
body with a capacity which forms a suitable instrument for it, i.e. our potential
intellect (112.11-18), and 'our intellect' is described as a combination of potential
intellect with the activity of the divine intellect (112.18-20). It follows that, for Cl,
when we are said to think, it is actually the divine intellect thinking through us
(112.23-5, 30)—an idea that does not appear in B any more than in A or in
Alexander's De anima. And consequently it seems probable that something has
dropped out of the text between B and Cl, taking with it the name of the proponent
of Cl.3 It has indeed been suggested that B and Cl record the views of the same
person, who followed an orthodox exposition of school-doctrine in B by a distinctive
solution to a particular problem in Cl.4 The doctrine of Cl is indeed explicitly
1
 All references to the text of the De intellectu (which forms part of the De anima libri mantissa,
Supplement to the book On the Soul) are to the page and line numbers of the edition by I. Bruns in
Supplementum Aristotelicum 2.2 (Berlin, 1892).
2
 vovs dvpaOev: Aristotle, De generatione animalium 2.3 736b28.
3
 P. Moraux, Alexandre a"Aphrodise: Exegete de la noitique d'Aristote (Liege and Paris, 1942),
148; F. M. Schroeder and R. B. Todd, Two Aristotelian Greek Commentators on the Intellect: The
De Intellectu attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias and Themistius' Paraphrase of Aristotle De
Anima 3.4-8 (Toronto, 1990), 23, 30-1.
4
 Originally suggested by F. Trabucco, '11 problema del "De philosophia" di Aristocle di
Messene e la sua dottrina', Acme 11 (1958), 97-150, at 120-3, followed by P. Moraux, Aristoteles,
der Lehrer Alexanders von Aphrodisias', Archivfur Geschichte der Philosophie 49 (1967), 169-82
at 174-5, by R. W. Sharpies, 'Alexander of Aphrodisias: scholasticism and innovation', Aufstieg
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presented as an original proposal;5 but the difference between B and Cl concerning
the relation of 'intellect from outside' to our functioning intellect is difficult to
reconcile with the view that they both derive from the same person.6
Just because the solution advanced in Cl is so distinctive,7 one might naturally
expect the author of C2, in reporting Cl before himself attacking it, to identify its
proponent, to whom he does after all refer ('wanting to show . . .') in the first-person
singular. And it is in this connection that the claim that there is a lacuna at 112.5 is
particularly significant. For if the name of the proponent of Cl was not in fact given
there, and if Cl and B were in fact reports of the views of the same person, one would
naturally look for the required identification of that person at the start of B.8
Section B opens with the following notorious words:
(1) "HKOVOO. Se nepl vov TOV Bvpadev irapd ApiororeXovs, a Sieaa>adfiTjv. 110.4
(2) rd yap Ktvr/oavTa ApioTOreXr] eloayayeiv TOV Qvpadev vovv ravra iXeyero 5
eivar rj re dno TO>V ala8r)Twv dvaXoyia /cat ?} eiri TWV yivo/xevcov airdvTUiv.
uiairep yap ini irdvrwv TCOV yivofxivwv ear( ri TO wdaxov, eon TL Kal TO
1TOIOVV KO.I TplTOV £K TOVTOJV TO yiVOfJLCVOV . . . 8
(I) I also heard about the intellect from without, from Aristotle, (things) which I preserved. (2)
For the things that prompted Aristotle to introduce the intellect from without were said to be
these: the analogy from perceptible things and that applying to all things that come to be. For in
all things that come to be there is something that is acted upon, something that acts, and thirdly
what is produced from these . . .
Zeller emended 'Aristotle' here to 'Aristocles', on the grounds that no one could have
supposed that what follows was Aristotle's own view.9 However, later Peripatetics,
itnd Niedergang der romischen Welt, vol. 2.36.1 (Berlin, 1987), H76-1243 at 1212, and by
P. Accattino and P. L. Donini, Alessandro di Afrodisia: L'anima (Rome and Ban, 1996), xxvii and
n.78.
5
 H2.8, 'following his own idea' (/car' Ihlav emvoiav). H3.2-4, 'he said that, if one is to
suppose that intellect is divine and imperishable according to Aristotle at all, one must think [that
it is so] in this way, and not otherwise', shows that the proposer of the doctrine was presenting his
interpretation in a speculative way, and 112.19-20 refers to Aristotle for one particular
terminological point in a way that may suggest the rest of the doctrine presented is less strictly
Aristotelian.
6
 The unusual use of the first-person singular both in B (at HO.4-5) and in C2 (at 113.12),
noted by M. Rashed, 'A "new" text of Alexander on the soul's motion', in R. Sorabji (ed.),
Aristotle and After. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, Suppl. Vol. 68 (London, 1997),
181-95 at 192, n. 28, is an argument for the reporter of B and the reporter of Cl (and author of
the criticism in C2) being the same person, not for the proponents of the doctrines reported in B
and in Cl being the same.
7
 Cf. Schroeder and Todd (n. 3), 73, and the discussions cited there. There are similarities
between Cl and the discussion in Alexander, Quaestio 2.3 of the influence of the heavens (cf.
113.6-12 here); there is also a possible reference back from the latter (at 48.19-22) to the former
(cf. P. Moraux, Alexander von Aphrodisias Quaest. 2.3', Hermes 95 [1967], 159-69, at 160, n. 2,
163-4, n. 2). But the Quaestio speaks only of the effect of the motion of the heavens in making
human beings rational, not of a supra-personal intellect which is active in our thinking.
8
 We are grateful to an anonymous referee of the first version of this paper for emphasizing
this point. One might indeed argue, against the interpretation of the beginning of B that we will
be advocating, that, regardless of any question concerning Cl , the source of B itself needs to be
indicated. But just because B is broadly similar to A, this requirement seems much less pressing
than does the identification of the proponent of Cl . There is indeed a question why it was
thought worthwhile to add B to A at all; but that is another issue.
9
 E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung 3.14 (Leipzig,
1909), 815, n. 3.
254 J. OPSOMER AND R. W. SHARPLES
and especially Alexander, are very ready to present their own interpretations as
Aristotle's views,10 and there is no doctrinal reason to suppose any reference
to Aristocles here. Moraux in 1942 supposed that the doctrine was being attributed
to Aristotle and that the reference to 'hearing' was to be taken not in the literal sense
of 'hearing from Aristotle's own mouth' but in that of 'through a tradition which
refers to Aristotle'." In 1967, however, he identified 'Aristotle' in (1) not with
Aristotle of Stagira but with the second-century A.D. Peripatetic Aristoteles of
Mytilene, and argued that this Aristoteles had been Alexander's teacher.12 This,
however, means that the name.'Aristotle' has to refer to two different people in the
space of two lines.13
It has been argued that 'hear', aKoveiv, can in ancient Greek usage regularly be used
in the context of acquaintance with the views of people long since dead, and that this
usage reflects an ancient practice of reading aloud, or of being read to by a slave.14
How widespread such a practice actually was has been questioned;15 so too has
whether aKoveiv can actually mean 'read'.16 But these may not be the central issues for
our passage anyway. For, given that philosophical theories and positions must have
been discussed orally, as well as in writing, in antiquity at least as much as now, the
question is rather whether one could say that one had 'heard' a view of a thinker long
since dead, whether or not it is a matter of referring to any written text.17
However, we are concerned not just with aKovew but with aKoveiv napd. Moraux in
1967 pointed out that aKoveiv napd with the genitive seems to be used only of literal
hearing from a living person.18 But napd with the genitive, and specifically with the
genitive ApiaroriXovs, is used elsewhere in the mantissa—in titles, admittedly—to
indicate the derivation of a doctrine from Aristotle.19 Schroeder and Todd therefore
suggested that we should read in 110.4 rather "Hxovoa 8e <ra> nepl vov TOV
10
 Cf. e.g. Alexander, Defato 164.13, 212.5, 17 (though at 171.17 the reference is rather to the
opinion of the Peripatetics); De providentia 31.20 Ruland. See also R. W. Sharpies, Alexander of
Aphrodisias: Quaestiones 1.1-2.15 (London, 1992), 86, n. 266.
" 'par une tradition qui se reclamait d'Aristote': Moraux (n. 3), 148.
12
 Moraux (n. 4), esp. 176-82.
13
 As is pointed out by P. Thillet, Alexandre d'Aphrodise: Traite du Destin (Paris, 1984), xvii.
14
 Cf. D. Schenkeveld, 'Prose usages of OLKOVSIV "to read'", CQ 42 (1992), 129-41. A clear
example is the emperor Julian's statement in Oratio 8(5).3 162C that he remembered hearing
Xenarchus 'saying certain things' (roiavra yap iyct> p.4jxvqp.ai TOV Eevdp\ov XeyovTos
aK-nKows); Julian lived in the fourth century A.D., Xenarchus in the first century B.c.
l{
 By A. K.Gavrilov, 'Techniques of reading in classical antiquity', CQ 47 (1997), 56-73, and
M. F. Burnyeat, 'Postcript on silent reading', CQ 47 (1997), 74-6; we are grateful to Pamela Huby
for drawing our attention to these discussions and to that in the following note. Schenkeveld (n.
14), 130 already recognizes that reading aloud was not the most common practice.
16
 By S. Usener, Isokrates, Platon undihr Publikum (Tubingen, 1994: ScriptOralia, 63), 164, n.
39. What concerns us is however rather whether aKoveiv can refer to the acquisition of
information by reading or hearing about an author no longer alive.
17
 Schenkeveld's examples of dicoveiv Xeyovros applying to Aristotle do involve reports of the
content of Aristotelian texts, extant now or lost: Schenkeveld (n. 14), 133. Cf. Schroeder and
Todd (n. 3), 24, n. 79.
18
 Moraux (n. 4), 175; cf. Schroeder and Todd (n. 3), 24. Thillet (n. 13), xvi-xvii, citing
Plutarch, De audiendis poetis 37a3-4, notes that dxovfiv napd with the dative is used to refer to a
doctrine one has heard of in a certain context, with no implication that one has heard it directly
from the original source; indeed the context explicitly refers both to hearing and to reading
(irpoaK7]KooTes . .. xal npoaveywKOTes, 36el3-fl), and when Plutarch refers to what is heard
napd rots <f>iXoo6<j>ois what follows is, as Thillet notes, verbatim quotation of Epicurus.
" Mantissa 150.19, TWV napd ApiaroreXovs nepl TOV npwrov oiKelov; 169.33, TWV napd
ApioroTfXovs nepi TOV £</>' T/fxtv, 172.16, as 169.33 (but with totally different doctrine!).
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OvpaOev irapa ApioroTeXovs, a SieocDodprjv, 'I also heard the doctrine from Aristotle
about the intellect from without, which I preserved.'20 Accattino and Donini reject this,
partly because of the emendation it involves.21
It may, however, be possible to achieve essentially the same result from the trans-
mitted text, by construing wapa ApujTorekovs with vov TOV dvpadev rather than with
rJKovoa—as the word-order might in any case imply: 'I also heard, about the intellect
from without from Aristotle, [things] which I preserved.'22 True, here too one might
expect the dative, but the titles cited in note 14 suggest that the genitive could be used.
The difference is presumably that the dative implies an opinion in Aristotle, the genitive
one 'from' him, i.e. deriving from him; and though we might find it more natural to
talk about the active intellect in Aristotle, to speak of that deriving from him, i.e. from
what he says, does not seem impossible.23
Moreover, this interpretation removes another slight awkwardness. It is one thing
to say that what one is going to say is Aristotelian even though it is in fact an inter-
pretation; another to attribute, as construing napa. ApiororiXovs with rjKovaa would
imply, an explanation in the third person of Aristotle's own motives to Aristotle
himself. This might indeed be acceptable, if we suppose that (1) is, as it were, a heading
tacked on to the beginning of an already existing discussion referring to Aristotle in
the third person. That 110.4—but omitting "Hxovaa he and a hieawaaixrjv—might be
'a kind of title' is indeed suggested by Schroeder and Todd,24 but retracted because
here the reference to Aristotle comes after that to the subject matter, whereas in the
titles cited in note 18 it comes before. The cases are not in fact similar. In the case of TO
i(f>' r/fiiv it is appropriate to specify that the doctrine is (or at least is claimed to be)
Aristotle's rather than someone else's, because others besides Peripatetics discussed TO
e<f>' -fiiLiv. On the other hand 'intellect from outside' (yovs Ovpadev) is distinctively
Aristotelian; so rather than distinguishing Aristotle's doctrine from someone else's, it
is a matter of adding a reference to Aristotle simply in order to fill out the description
of the doctrine in question.
Nevertheless, that "Hxovoa Se and a hieawaaixr/v should be retained, and that
110.4 is not a title in the strict sense, is suggested by yap in 110.5. The great majority of
the texts in the mantissa and quaestiones attributed to Alexander begin, after their
titles,25 with no connecting particle at all; a few which are presented as parts of a
sequence begin with Se.26 The only ones to begin with yap are Quaestio 2.12 and
20
 Schroeder and Todd (n. 3), 28-30.
21
 Accattino and Donini (n. 4), xxvii, n. 77. See also below, n. 29.
22
 The text, it may be noted, has vov TOV dvpadev, not TOV dvpadev vov. Why? Perhaps
because the sense is 'intellect—more specifically, the intellect from without' (cf. H. W. Smyth,
Greek Grammar (Cambridge, MA, 1920 [1980"], §1159); and in that case the reference to Aris-
totle, 'intellect—more specifically the intellect from without in, or which derives from, Aristotle',
may seem a natural and indeed necessary completion. The implicit reference to Aristotle at 110.25
confirms that 110.6-25 is considered as truly from Aristotle and suggests that the rest of the
discussion (from 110.25 onwards) is conducted in an equally Aristotelian vein; in this respect B is
to be contrasted with Cl (above, n. 5).
23
 In the case of the titles later in the Mantissa (above n. 18), to speak of what derives from
Aristotle, rather than what is in him, concerning responsibility (TO e<j>' ^p.iv) is entirely suitable;
Aristotle uses the expression, but the argument of these sections is hardly 'in Aristotle', verbatim
or otherwise. Similarly, Aristotle says that intellect comes 'from outside', but could hardly be said
to develop the idea in detail.
24
 Schroeder and Todd (n. 12), 30.
25
 Which were probably a d d e d later; cf. B runs (n. 1), xi.
26
 For example Mantissa 130.14, 134.30, 136.30, from a sequence o n vision; cf. R . W. Sharpies,
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Ethical Problem 7, but here there is a logical connection between the sentence following
the title and a controversy already indicated in the title. Unless yap in 110.5 refers to
what preceded in an original, and now unrecoverable, context from which B has been
extracted,27 it should be taken as referring back not to a putative title consisting only
of the words nepl vov TOV Bvpadev vapa -MpioToreAous, but to the decision, indicated
by hieawaapvqv, to record the doctrine ('I preserved this and set it out here. That was
because it seemed worth recording. For he said that . . .').28
It seems, then, that the difficulty of referring to Aristotle as the source of an inter-
pretation of his own doctrines is not to be avoided by treating 110.4 as a title. If on the
other hand, as here suggested, we interpret it as '(1) I also heard, about the intellect
from without (which comes) from Aristotle, (things) which I preserved. (2) For the
things that prompted Aristotle to introduce the intellect from without were said to be
these . . . ' the difficulty simply disappears.29
It therefore seems to us that Schroeder and Todd are essentially right. The reporter
of B is simply referring to an interpretation that he has heard of the Aristotelian
'intellect from outside'; we do not know whose interpretation this was, and there is no
reason to connect it with Aristoteles of Mytilene.30
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven JAN OPSOMER
University College London BOB SHARPLES
'Alexander and pseudo-Alexanders of Aphrodisias: scripta minima. Questions and Problems,
makeweights and prospects', in Wolfgang Kullmann, Jochen Althoff, and Markus Asper (edd.),
Gattungen wissenschaftlicher Literatur in der Antike (Tubingen, 1998: ScriptOralia, 95), 383^108
at 395-6. Cf. also roivvv at Mantissa 141.30; iceu at Mantissa 169.34 and Ethical Problem 24.
27
 yap certainly cannot be taken as linking 110.5 directly to the end of A in 110.3.
28
 J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (Oxford, 19542), 59 refers to yap 'after an expression
denoting the giving or receiving of information, or conveying a summons to attention'.
29
 Accattino and Donini (n. 4), xxvii, n.77 argue that the name 'Aristoteles' would not need to
be repeated if it refers to the same person both in (1) and in (2). But in (1) Aristotle is referred to
as the authority from whom the theory derives; in (2) the reference is to a discussion of his
motives. And that difference is sufficient to justify the repetition.
30
 On the other evidence for Aristoteles of Mytilene as Alexander's teacher cited by Moraux in
1967, cf. Thillet (n. 13), xix-xxxi; R. Goulet, Aristote de Mytilene', in id. (ed.) Dictionnaire des
philosophes antiques, vol. 1 (Paris, 1989), 411-12; Schroeder and Todd (n. 3), 25. There remains
the reference to 'our Aristotle' at Alexander, In metaph. 166.19-20, noted by P Moraux, 'Ein
neues Zeugnis fiber Aristoteles, den Lehrer Alexanders von Aphrodisias', Archivfiir Geschichte
der Philosophie 67 (1985), 266-9 and by P. Accattino, 'Alessandro di Afrodisia e Aristotele di
Mitilene', Elenchos 6 (1985), 67-74. But, as Schroeder and Todd (n. 3), 27-8 note, this can only
establish that Aristoteles of Mytilene was Alexander's teacher if one combines it with the De
intellectu passage, interprets the De intellectu passage in the manner in which Moraux did in 1967,
and accepts that the De intellectu is an authentic work of Alexander's.
